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"It is indeed a constitutional moment."' Thus spoke Senator Moynihan in
his stinging critique of the first version of that was to become the welfare
reform act of 1996. Certainly enactment of welfare reform by the 104th
Congress and President Clinton was a highly significant political event. The
legislation not only gave more control to the states, but demonstrated that
cutting entitlements is not politically infeasible. But does this policy shift rise
to the level of constitutional change? Does Senator Moynihan's statement
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reflect his extraordinary prescience on matters related to public assistance-or
his equally characteristic flair for rhetorical overstatement?
Senator Moynihan used the term constitutional not in the cramped
conventional manner-i.e. how the United States Supreme Court interprets the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights-but in an older and broader
sense: the beliefs and practices that constitute the foundation of the American
regime. Throughout American history no political beliefs have been more
important than those concerning the nature and protection of individual rights;
and few practices more important than the way we distribute power among
national, state, and local governments.
A curious feature of American politics has been the way in which debates
over individual rights have gone hand-in-hand with debates over federalism. At
the Founding the Antifederalists warned that a stronger federal government
would extinguish liberty; the Federalists convincingly countered that only a
more powerful national government could protect it. States' rights later became
the primary barrier to the protection of the civil rights of African-Americans.
Protection of private property was allied with a broad reading of the federal
government's power to regulate interstate commerce in the Marshall era, and
with a narrow reading in the period of substantive due process. The Warren
Court's incorporation of the Bill of Rights and its diverse efforts to root out
segregation required an unprecedented assault on the traditional prerogatives
of state and local governments.
In short, in the US debates about federalism are seldom merely matters of
efficiency, management, or finding the most convenient means for achieving
agreed-upon ends. These debates are often proxies for broader arguments about
the proper role of government. This should make us ponder what the current
trend toward devolution of authority means for the way we define and enforce
individual rights.
Since the New Deal, centralization of authority has gone hand-in-hand with
the expansion of a particular type of individual rights-positive rights
guaranteeing government benefits and protections. Not surprisingly, most
current efforts to return more power to state and local governments are tied to
proposals for limiting the size and reach of the public sector. The slippery term
"devolution" is now politically popular precisely because it can mean either
reducing the size of government or redistributing power within government.
The close connection between federalism and rights should lead us to ask
what the current debate over federalism tells us about the future of the
American welfare state and, conversely, what popular attachment to a broad
understanding of individual rights tells us about the future of federalism. This
Article addresses these questions first by examining the beliefs and political
practices that have contributed to centralization of political authority and
expansion of positive rights, and then by showing how support for this regime
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has eroded over the past fifteen years.
I. THE REGIME OF PROGRAMMATIC RIGHTS
Elsewhere I have argued that the period stretching roughly from 1964 to
1994 can be characterized as a regime of "programmatic rights."2 Program-
matic rights are a hybrid in several senses. Although they are not constitutional
in the strict sense of the word, they are more than simply statutory. They are
the product of both congressional enactment and extensive judicial interpreta-
tion-interpretation usually informed by constitutional precedents and values.
Moreover, many (though not all) are administered jointly by state, local, and
federal governments. Unlike the rights of free speech, religion, property, and
privacy, which set limits on the power of government officials, programmatic
rights require extensive public programs rather than private autonomy, a
welfare state rather than limited government.
The paradigm for programmatic rights can be found in the civil rights
established through legislative, judicial, and administrative action starting in
1964. In 1963 President Kennedy described the legislative proposal that
eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as "sound public constitutional
policy." 3 This was an apt description since the act's purpose was to define and
protect what most of us consider rights established by the 14th and 15th
Amendments. At the time Alexander Bickel described the act as "a fundamen-
tally new departure in federal legislation," and noted that Kennedy's phrase
jointed two previously distinct categories: constitutional law (the realm of the
courts) and public policy (the realm of the legislative and executive branches).4
After passage of the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, the line between
constitutional law and public policy became all the more attenuated. For many
years the courts interpreted the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act
liberally to conform with evolving interpretations of the 14th and 15th
Amendments and changing understandings of the nature of racial discrimina-
tion. Indeed, judges were often willing to be more aggressive in expanding
statutory rights, not because they believed they were following legislative intent
but because they considered it prudent to package innovation as statutory-and
thus reversible by Congress-rather than as set in constitutional stone.
Administrative agencies in turn interpreted statutory phrases to conform with
court rulings. The courts both deferred to agency expertise and expanded upon
administrative action. The agencies then used judicial validation to protect
2. R. Shep Melnick, The Court, Congress, and Programmatic Rights, in REMAKING AMERICAN
POLmCS (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 1988); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES:
INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 13-19 (1993) [hereinafter MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LiNES].
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Civil Right Act of 1964, 38 COMMENTARY 33, 33 (1964) (quoting
1963 press conference with President Kennedy).
4. Id.
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themselves from political attack. Separation of powers thus produced a
ratcheting up of regulatory requirements as each branch built slowly and
quietly on the initiatives of the others.
In school desegregation, for example, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued controversial
guidelines with precise quotas and deadlines for southern school systems. As
Steven Halpern has shown, the OCR borrowed these standards from previous
rulings of the Fifth Circuit. According to Halpern,
[A]ppropriating the 'objective' constitutional standards of courts gave HEW
policies the imprimatur of legality, adding badly needed legitimacy,
credibility, and authority to HEW's fledgling efforts to enforce Title VI.
... HEW officials realized that federal courts were a good ally, and the
agency had few allies in beginning the politically touchy task [of desegrega-
tion]... [I]n meetings with angry southern educators HEW officials could
claim that their hands were tied-that court decisions and hence, indirectly,
the Constitution itself, required HEW to be as insistent as it was.5
One finds a similar ratcheting up of federal rules and movement toward
proportional representation under the Voting Rights Act.6
In subsequent legislation Congress created new protected classes and
expanded the administrative and judicial remedies available to victims of
discrimination. Yet it did little to clarify the meaning of the key term
"discrimination." As judges and administrators quietly replaced the Civil
Rights Act's "color-blind" understanding of civil rights with a de facto
requirement of proportional representation, Congress remained silent. When
the Supreme Court adopted a narrow reading of civil rights in cases such as
City of Mobil v. Bolden,7 Grove City College v. Bell,' and Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio,9 Congress wrote ambiguous new legislation that
attempted to reestablish the status quo ante.
Far from an isolated example, civil rights became a model for emulation.
Since the requirements and evolution of many of these nondiscrimination
statutes are well known, it will suffice simply to list some of them: Title IX of
the 1972 Education Amendments (gender), section 504 of the Rehabilitation
5. STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF LAW 73 (1995). See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 452-62 (1990); JOHN DAVID
SKRBNTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
6. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COuNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS (1987).
7. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (finding no racial discrimination in voting arrangements without evidence
of invidious intent).
8. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (limiting applicability of Title VI).
9. 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding evidence of statistical disparity in hiring cases does not establish
prima facie case under Title VID.
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Act of 1973 (disability), the Age Discrimination Act, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. For better or worse, one of the most important governmental
consequences of this new form of joint "constitutional policymaking" by the
courts, Congress, and the executive branch is expanded federal control over
state and local school systems, voting procedures, employment practices, and
institutions for the retarded and mentally ill.
A similarly complex combination of legislative, judicial, and administrative
action created extensive rights to a safe workplace and a healthy environment.
Such rights were not abstract statements of general policy, but judicially
enforceable promises of governmental assistance. Congress made sure of this
by writing citizen suit provisions that allowed any citizen to sue either private
parties who violate state and federal rules or federal officials who fail to
perform nondiscretionary duties. In his frequently quoted opinion in Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus-which announced the arrival of the
"new administrative law"-Judge David Bazelon explained that the "fundamen-
tal personal interests in life, health and liberty" have "a special claim to
judicial protection"-unlike mere "economic interests." 0 Not surprisingly,
for many years a principal theme of the Sierra Club was that "[e]very
American has a right to a safe and healthy environment." In 1995 the Club
issued a report asserting that "Newt Gingrich's Contract is about taking away
our rights to clean water, clean air, and clean food."" Out with the old-
fashioned property rights, in with the new civil and social rights.
A third category of programmatic rights-the one on which this Article will
focus-is entitlements. Entitlement is a slippery term, the meaning of which is
frequently manipulated for tactical political reasons. Perhaps the most useful
definition comes from the Congressional Budget Act: "Authorizations for
entitlements constitute a binding obligation on the part of the Federal
Government, and eligible recipients have legal recourse if the obligation is not
fulfilled." 12 Entitlements predate the New Deal: Civil War and Revolutionary
War pensions, land grants, pensions for the widows of federal employees-all
these were recognized as entitlements much earlier. Well before the alleged
"demise of the rights-privilege distinction" in the 1960s, federal judges
frequently ordered federal administrators to pay benefits promised by
Statute. 14
10. 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11. Al Kamen, The Sierra Club's Hidden Agenda, WASH. POSr NAT'L WKLY., Mar. 18-24,1996,
at 15; see also Current Developments, 25 ENVmONMENTAL REPORTER 1691 (1995).
12. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET
PROCESS (1980) reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: A GENERAL EXPLANATION (Comm. Print 1981).
13. See Laura S. Jensen, he Early American Origins of Entitlements (1996) (unpublished paper,
on file with author).
14. See MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2, at 48-58.
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What was new in the 1960s was the willingness of the courts to take an
independent, expansive reading of the benefits owed to individuals, and in
effect to transform grants-in-aid to the states into entitlements for individuals.
Two programs that expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s-education for
disabled children and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-
illustrate the subtle ways in which a shift in judicial doctrines on federalism
and statutory interpretation can alter the size and character of entitlements
programs. These two programs differ substantially. In the case of education for
disabled children, Congress wrote a new law based on lower federal court
interpretations of the constitutional rights of disabled children. In the case of
AFDC, the courts used a novel interpretation of an existing statute (Title IV of
the Social Security Act of 1935) to redesign a perennially unpopular program.
In both instances, though, the combination of court and congressional action
forced sub-national governments to obey the commands of national officials and
to pick up a substantial part of the tab as well.
II. RIGHTS AS MANDATES: EDUCATION FOR DISABLED CHILDREN
Public education in the United States is notoriously decentralized. Before
1970, education of disabled students was the province of state and local
governments. As a result, some severely retarded or incapacitated students
were excluded from public school altogether. Others were herded into classes
for "slow learners." All too often minority students were misdiagnosed as
retarded."5 In the late 1960s a few members of Congress began to push for
increased funding for special education. But facing determined opposition from
the White House, they made little headway.
The political landscape shifted significantly as a result of two federal
district court rulings of the early 1970s, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania [hereinafter PARC] and Mills v. Board of Educa-
tion.16 These decisions required school systems to provide all handicapped
students with an "appropriate" education, and established elaborate procedures
to determine what "appropriate" means for each child. PARC and Mills
provided the policy model and the political catalyst for a major federal law, the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 [hereinafter EAHCA]. 17
This law requires local school systems to provide each handicapped child
with "a free appropriate public education" 8 and to offer "related services"
15. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (enjoining use of IQ tests for assigning
minority students to classes for retarded).
16. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Mills v. Board of Edue., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
17. Pub. L. No. 94-142 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1461 (1994)); see also
MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2, at 135-178.
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994).
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such as transportation, physical therapy, psychological counseling, and even
residential care in psychiatric hospitals.19 To safeguard these new rights, the
law requires school officials to consult with parents in devising a legally
enforceable "individualized educational program,"' and gives parents the
right to appeal schools' decisions first at an "impartial due process hearing"
and ultimately in federal court.21 The 1975 law is a classic unfunded mandate:
the cost of complying with these requirements is probably around $40 billion
per year, but the federal government only contributes about $3 billion
annually.2
Supporters of the bill explained that they were simply trying to help states
comply with widely recognized constitutional requirements. According to the
Senate Report, "[c]ourt action and State laws throughout the Nation have made
clear that the right to education of handicapped children is a present right, one
which is to be implemented immediately. "23 The Act's chief sponsor, Senator
Harrison Williams, told his colleagues that "what we are trying to do... [is
provide] the means to carry out the fundamental law of the land."2'
Despite repeated claims about their authoritative nature, PARC and Mills
were surprisingly shaky legal precedents. One was a consent decree and the
other was based primarily on local law in the District of Columbia. Soon after
these two court rulings, the Supreme Court announced in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez that the courts should not use the
Equal Protection Clause to establish novel educational policies.' If Congress
had not passed the EAHCA, it is quite likely that PARC and Mills would have
become exhibits in the museum of Warren-era initiatives abandoned by the
Burger Court.
Recognizing this, groups representing the disabled avoided appellate review
and used their success in the lower courts to push for congressional action. As
one advocate put it, the strategy was "to cook the school districts until they
came to Congress demanding the funds that we [need] to provide appropriate
programs."' The strategy worked. PARC, Mills, several state court decisions
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994); see also MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2. at
136.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1)(A) (1994); see 20 U.S.C. §1401(a)(19).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2), (c), (e) (1994).
22. Jeffrey Katz, Policy on Disabled is Scrutinized OverDiscipline Problems, Cost, 54 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1295 (1996).
23. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., ist Sess. 17 (1975).
24. Education for All Handicapped Children: Hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Handicapped ofthe Senate Comm. onLabor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., lstSess. 312 (1975). The
committee's ranking Republican, Senator Robert Stafford, later wrote that "the law codified the rights
already spelled out in earlier court decisions." Senator Robert Stafford, Education for the Handicapped:
A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71, 76 (1978).
25. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
26. Quoted in Jack Tweedie, The Politics ofLegalization, in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES 53 (Jay
G. Chambers & William T. Hartman eds., 1983).
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adopting their reasoning, and the threat of further litigation led states to
increase expenditures for special education from $900 million in 1972 to over
$2 billion in 1975.27 State and local school officials demanded that Congress
provide more money to fund these requirements and clearer guidelines to
reduce the threat of extended litigation. According to Paul Peterson and his
coauthors, "[n]either the pressures of interest groups nor the general receptivity
of Congress would have been sufficient to pass the 1975 Act without two court
decisions that greatly altered the states' responsibility for education of the
handicapped. "2
School officials' hopes for more federal money and less litigation were
quickly dashed. Not only did proceedings within the schools become more
court-like and adversarial, but federal judges played an even greater role in
evaluating school policies. Although the Supreme Court directed lower courts
to show deference to rulings of school officials, many federal district and
circuit courts adopted an expansive interpretation of "appropriate education"
and "related services."
Over the past twenty years, Congress has neither clarified the substantive
mandates of the EAHCA nor provided enough money to cover state costs.
Congress, however, twice passed legislation overturning Supreme Court
decisions that made it more difficult for parents to bring and win suits against
school officials.29 Despite grumbling about the inflexibility of the law,
Republicans in the 104th Congress recommended only minor changes in the
statute.30 The law is not affected by the unfunded mandate legislation passed
in 1995, which applies only to subsequent legislation. Congress has been quite
happy to allow the courts to define the content of the federal right and to let
state and local school systems bear almost all of the cost. The strategy of rights
employed by advocates for the disabled thus allows members of Congress to
claim credit for protecting benefits while avoiding blame for raising taxes.
Ill. FEDERAL STRINGS AND CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE:
THE EXPANSION OF AFDC
The AFDC program originally created by Title IV of the Social Security
Act of 1935 currently provides income support for 14.5 million poor women
and children at a cost of about $25 billion annually split roughly equally
27. William Wilkin & David Porter, State Aid for Special Education: Who Benefits?, 1976
LEGISLATORS' EDUCATION ACTION PROGRAM, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS 1
(1976).
28. PAUL PETERSON, BARRY RABE & KENNETH WONG, WHEN FEDERAUISM WORKS 56 (1986).
29. See Handicapped Children Protection Act of 1986, and Education of the Handicapped Act
Amendments of 1990 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1994)).
30. Jeffrey L. Katz, Panel 0Ks IDEA Revision Despite Controversies, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.,
June 1, 1996, at 1532.
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between the federal government and the states." For many years it has also
been a primary gateway for Medicaid and other benefits.
Originally, Title IV provided federal financial support for mothers' pension
programs already established by many states. When the Committee on
Economic Security's proposal came before Congress in 1935, the only issue
debated was the extent of federal control. A provision stating that benefit levels
must be "reasonable" was amended to require states to provide assistance "as
far as practicable under the conditions of such State."32 The Senate was
particularly adamant about removing all vestiges of federal dictation. Both the
House and Senate Reports explained that a state could "impose such other
eligibility requirements-as to means, moral character, etc.-as it sees fit."
33
The Senate Report added, "[1]ess Federal control is provided than in any recent
Federal aid law."
34
Title IV established a grant-in-aid program which would reimburse states
for payments made for the care of children who were both "needy" according
to state standards and "deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of
a parent." 31 Only a few additional conditions were attached to federal grants:
state programs were to assure the confidentiality of clients' files and had to be
administered by a single state agency; states could not impose residency
requirements of more than one year or use waiting lists to ration benefits; and
applicants denied benefits or recipients whose benefits were cut were
guaranteed an administrative hearing. Federal administrators were never happy
with their lack of control over the states, but soon resigned themselves to the
fact that they could do little but offer professional advise and encouragement
to induce state administrators to change state rules. Over the next forty years
a variety of legislative efforts to rationalize and nationalize AFDC all met with
failure.36
The legal assistance program created by Lyndon B. Johnson's War on
Poverty spearheaded an ambitious effort to reform AFDC through litigation
rather than legislation. The first, constitutional phase of the welfare rights
campaign produced two notable decisions, Goldberg v. Kell y and Shapiro
31. Vee Burke, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS ISSUE BRIEF: WELFARE REFORM
(October 2, 1995).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
33. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 36 (1935); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24 (1935).
34. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1994).
36. MELNIcK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2, at 67-75.
37. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding Due Process Clause requires hearing before termination of
welfare benefits).
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v. Thompson.38 In two subsequent AFDC cases, Dandridge v. Williams39 and
Jefferson v. Hackney,4° a majority of the Court refused to find a right to
welfare in the Constitution. At that point, statutory interpretation became the
chief tool of legal reformers.
In a series of decisions issued between 1968 and 1972, the Supreme Court
transformed AFDC into an individual entitlement by eliminating a variety of
state eligibility rules and substantially increasing the federal government's
control over the states. The Court's King-Townsend-Remillard trilogy4
reversed the presumption about AFDC eligibility that had guided policymaking
for the preceding thirty years: prior to 1968 state and federal officials had
assumed that states could impose any rule not explicitly prohibited by federal
statute; now the Court held that the states could not impose restrictions on
eligibility unless, the statute explicitly authorized them to do so. According to
Justice Brennan's opinion in Townsend,
[I]n the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly
evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state
eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under
federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is
therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.4'
A year later, Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Carleson v. Remillard
maintained that Congress "intended to provide a program for the economic
security and protection of all children."4"
Since the statute was silent on almost all eligibility issues, the Court's
interpretation cast doubt on the validity of a wide array of state rules. The
Senate Finance Committee later complained:
These decisions have used the very broadness of the Federal statute
(intended to allow States more latitude) against the States by saying
sometimes that anything the Congress did not expressly prohibit it must
have intended to require-and sometimes that what Congress did not
expressly permit it must have intended not to permit.44
38. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding state prohibition on welfare benefits to residents of less than one
year violates Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
39. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
40. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
41. Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
42. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 286.
43. Carlson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. at 604.
44. S. REP. NO. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
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Legal services attorneys flooded the federal courts with cases contesting nearly
every facet of state programs.
Although the Supreme Court was not always consistent in its adherence to
this strict presumption of eligibility, the lower courts were quick to apply and
extend the logic of the King-Townsend-Remillard trilogy. Federal circuit and
district courts struck down state rules requiring AFDC mothers to identify the
father of their children and cooperate in child support prosecutions by the
state;45 requiring recipients to accept various types of work;' disqualifying
those previously found guilty of fraud;47 and requiring stepparents to disclose
their income.4" The lower courts also prohibited states from automatically
reducing benefits to families receiving Social Security benefits, 49 child support
payments,50 tax refunds, 51 or income from a stepparent.52
The high point of judicial expansion of AFDC came when five circuit
courts ordered states to treat a fetus as a dependent child under the act, thus
making pregnant women eligible for benefits. The First Circuit explained that
"a finding of eligibility for the unborn is consistent with the purposes and
policies of the Social Security Act. The Supreme Court has declared the
'paramount goal' of the AFDC program to be the protection of needy children.
Payments to the unborn are an appropriate, if not essential, measure to that
end."53  Although the Supreme Court reprimanded the five appellate courts
for their "departure from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation,"' it
periodically reverted to its previous habit of establishing a virtually irrebuttable
45. Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1973); Doe v. Carleson, 356 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Doe v. Flowers, 364 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); Doe v. Ellis, 350 F. Supp. 375 (D.S.C.
1972); Doe v. Lavine, 347 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Storey v. Roberts, 352 F. Supp. 473 (M.D.
Fla. 1972); Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61
(N.D. Il. 1971); Meyer v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Or. 1971); Saddler v. Winstead, 332 F. Supp.
130 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Doe v. Harder, 310 F.
Supp. 302 (D. Conn. 1970); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510 (W.D. Pa. 1970). The Supreme Court
issued a brief affirmance of some of these decisions in Shirley v. Lavine, 420 U.S. 730 (1975).
46. Davis v. Reagan, 485 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D. Iowa 1980); McLean v. Mathews, 458 F. Supp.
524 (E.D. Va. 1973); Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973); Woolfolk v. Brown 325
F. Supp. 1162 (E.D.Va. 1971); Anderson v. Burson, 300 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1968). The Supreme
Court established a surprisingly lenient standard of review for work requirements in New York Dep't.
of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). See MELNICK, supra note 3, at 93-94, 100.
47. J.A. v. Ritti, 377 F. Supp. 1046 (D.N.J. 1974); Owen v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla.
1974); Cooper v. Laupheimer 316 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
48. Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972).
49. Riddick v. D'Elia, 626 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1980); Nelson v. Likins, 510 F.2d 414 (8th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Harder, 438 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1975); Howard v. Madigan, 383 F. Supp. 351 (D.S.D.
1973).
50. Swift v. Toia, 461 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gilliard v. Craig, 331 F. Supp. 587
(W.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).
51. Kaisa v. Chang, 396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Haw. 1975).
52. Archibald v. Whaland, 555 F.2d 1061 (ist Cir. 1977); Solman v. Shapiro, 300 F. Supp. 409
(D. Conn. 1970).
53. Carver v. Hooker, 501 F.2d 1244, 1247 (1974). The other lower court decisions are cited in
Parks v. Hardin, 504 F.2d 861, 863 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974).
54. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580 (1975).
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presumption of eligibility. In 1979, for example, Justice Marshall, writing for
a unanimous court, stated that a "participating State may not deny assistance
to persons who meet eligibility standards defined in the Social Security Act
unless Congress clearly has indicated that the standards are permissive. " "
Three years later, a district court again departed from "ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation," explaining that "King v. Smith and its progeny have
erected a fundamental principle of AFDC jurisprudence: that the Social
Security Act will not countenance depriving needy children of benefits because
of factors beyond their control, and unrelated to their need."
56
Reinterpretation of Title IV began in cases from the South that revealed
overt, egregious racial discrimination. It quickly evolved into an even more
ambitious effort to remake means-tested programs for whites as well as blacks,
in the North as well as the South. The goal was to make welfare more humane,
generous, and rule-bound, and less stigmatizing, intrusive, and moralistic.
Henry Aaron's description of a view of welfare popular in the late 1960s and
early 1970s catches the essential elements of the understanding of poverty that
informed many court decisions:
If poverty is believed to be the resultant of forces exogenous to the poor,
then the attachment of unpleasant conditions to assistance is a gratuitous
cruelty inflicted upon the already victimized. Indeed, this conception of
poverty suggests that welfare should be regarded as a right-as a form of
just compensation for a kind of casualty loss, the accident of poverty. This
view, or something very much like it, lay behind the drive in the early
1970s, to deliver welfare payments in dignified settings, with rights of
appeal and the assurance of due process, and without any coercion or
requirements that the recipients of aid do anything in return for it.
58
In short, "[c]ash should be provided on the basis of economic need and without
strings. 59
The political high-watermark of this version of welfare reform came in the
early 1970s, when President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan came close to
becoming law. Shortly thereafter, Congress began to move in the other
direction, imposing more federal restrictions relating to work and child
55. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 133 (1979).
56. Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041, 1050 (N.D. M1. 1982).
57. MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOvEMENT, 1960-73,
ch. 5 (1993).
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support.60 Ronald Reagan and other governors looked for ways to circumvent
the court rulings. Meanwhile, most states allowed inflation to eat away at
AFDC benefits. Conservatives in the Senate tried to overturn the federal
judiciary's interpretation of Title IV, but their efforts were routinely blocked
in the House. Stalemates in Congress in effect left the courts in charge of
eligibility rules.6'
What angered conservatives was not just expansion of federal and judicial
power, but the courts' substantive understanding of entitlements. Court rulings
established a strong presumption that benefits should be based on need alone,
rather than on the behavior of recipients. Although popular in academic circles,
this non-judgmental view of welfare had little support among voters or
members of Congress.6'
IV. POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHTS REGIME
As different as these two case studies are, both demonstrate the importance
of a particular form of "rights talk. "6 In each instance the rights defined by
the combined action of Congress and the courts required both national
uniformity and government protection of disadvantaged individuals. Of course
government protection of the disadvantage and greater national uniformity were
also cardinal principals of the New Deal and Great Society. Indeed, one of the
earliest and most cogent presentations of the principles behind programmatic
rights appears in the "Second Bill of Rights" announced by Franklin Roosevelt
in his 1944 State of the Union address and subsequent campaign speeches.
FDR may have sought a subservient judiciary, but he also announced an
Economic Bill of Rights to supplement the "sacred Bill of Rights of our
Constitution." This "Second Bill of Rights" included "the right to earn enough
to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation"; the right to "adequate
medical care, "a decent home," and "a good education"; and "the right to
adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident and
unemployment." Each of these rights, Roosevelt added, "must be applied to
all our citizens, irrespective of race, creed or color." "What all this spells,"
he claimed, "is security."' Fifty years later, President Clinton consciously
60. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN
AMERICA (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP (1986).
61. MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2, at 112-26.
62. FAY LOMAX COOK & EDITH J. BARRETr, SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE: THE
VIEWS OF CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC 58-145 (1992); STEVEN M. TELES, WHOSE WELFARE?: AFDC
AND POLITICAL ELITES (1996); MELNICK, supra note 3, at 54-61, 116-18.
63. I borrow the term from Mary Ann Glendon. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
64. 1944 State of the Union Address, in 13 FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES 41 (1950).
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echoed this theme in presenting his comprehensive health care bill, which he
titled the Health Security Act.
Eighteenth-century liberalism promised security from civil war, anarchy,
and arbitrary government action. Its cornerstone was the protection of a realm
of private autonomy from government intervention. Contemporary liberalism
promises a broader security-security against the vagaries of the business cycle
and other hazards created by dynamic capitalism; against the prejudices of
private citizens and the consequences of three centuries of racism; against the
risks of congenital handicaps and inevitable old age; and against the conse-
quences of poverty and of family decomposition. There is more here than
hollow campaign rhetoric. According to legal historian Lawrence Friedman,
one super-principle of contemporary legal culture is "the general expectation
that somebody will pay for any and all calamities that happen to a person,
provided only that it is not the victim's 'fault,' or at least not solely his
fault. "6
Protecting traditional rights (such as private property, free speech, and
religious liberty) required courts to limit the reach of government. The First
Amendment, for example, commands Congress to "make no law" abridging
freedom of speech or establishing religion. The courts' job was to prevent the
government from improperly interfering in this private realm. The new
understanding of rights, in contrast, has led the judiciary to use constitutional
and statutory interpretation to enlarge government's responsibilities. As the
examples of AFDC and education for the disabled illustrate, the courts have
both placed new issues on the public agenda and expanded programs created
by the other branches of government. Because they so often took these steps
under the guise of legislative intent, their contribution to the development of
the welfare state has not been sufficiently appreciated.
The institutional patterns one finds in enactment of the EAHCA and
reconstruction of AFDC are obviously a far cry from New Deal politics. To
put the matter starkly, the New Deal envisioned a forceful president, a
powerful executive branch, a compliant Congress, and a quiescent judiciary.
Most programmatic rights of the recent period were the product of an active
judiciary, an entrepreneurial Congress, an ambivalent federal bureaucracy, and
a foot-dragging president. After the election of Richard Nixon, those who
shared Roosevelt's vision of the Second Bill of Rights had little choice but to
switch institutional partners. They were aided by the previous transformation
of the Supreme Court from defender of property to protector of "discrete and
insular minorities." In short, the regime of programmatic rights rested on four
65. For a comparison of the Social Security Act and Clinton's Health Security Act, see Theda
Skocpol, From Social Security to Health Security?, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y. & L. 239 (1994).
66. LAWRENCE M. FRIDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE: WHAT AMERICANS WANT FROM THE LEGAL
SYSTEM AND WHY 43 (1985).
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pillars, which are outlined below.
1. Activist federal courts. Under the Warren Court, judicial efforts to
protect "discrete and insular minorities" often took the form of innovative
interpretations of equal protection and due process. Policymaking through
statutory interpretation fit the more cautious, ad hoe balancing style of the
Burger Court. It also facilitated coalition-building on that badly splintered
bench. Lower court judges steeped in the ways of the Warren Court found they
could best protect themselves from Supreme Court review by relying on
expansive readings of statutes rather than on novel interpretations of the
Constitution. Although the form and locus of decisionmaking changed-from
constitutional law to statutory interpretation, from the Supreme Court to the
lower courts-the push for expanded government programs and national
uniformity remained constant.67
Few court rulings expanding programmatic rights attained the notoriety of
judicial decisions on busing, abortion, or school prayer. Decisions expanding
programmatic rights were usually tied to arcane, seemingly technical shifts in
judicial doctrine on private rights of action,68 the use of legislative history and
broad statements of purpose in statutory interpretation,69 and the scope of
judicial review of administrative action. 70 Since they were not explicitly based
on constitutional law, these rulings allowed the judges to avoid direct
confrontation with elected officials at the national level.
2. Divided government. If liberal Democrats had continued to control
the presidency and the Congress as they did in 1935 and 1965, the complex,
indirect, incremental form of policymaking described above would not have
been necessary. If conservative Republicans or a coalition of Republicans and
Dixiecrats had controlled both branches, such policymaking would not have
been possible-especially if conservatives were able to place their comrades on
the federal bench. Since 1968 Democrats have controlled the presidency and
both houses of Congress for only six years. The last time the Republicans
captured all three was 1952. Once the exception, divided government is now
the norm.
Divided government not only intensified conflict between the executive and
legislative branches over the meaning of statutes, but impelled Congress to
67. MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES, supra note 2, at 36-59.
68. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutout, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (finding private right of action for state
deprivation of constitutional and other legal rights, privileges and immunities); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding private right of action for derivative and
direct stockholders under Security Exchange Act of 1934).
69. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 412 (1971).
Constructing a New Federalism
reorganize itself. The reformed Congress of the 1970s passed a large number
of laws opposed by the Republican administration and created an elaborate
record of the intent of Congress, or at least the intent of its increasingly
numerous and powerful subcommittees.
Republican presidents countered by expanding the size and responsibility
of the White House staff, strengthening the Office of Management and Budget,
and selecting sub-cabinet officials on the basis of ideological consistency with
the administration. Their goal was clear: to force the bureaucracy to take
orders from the White House rather than from subcommittees.
Congress scrambled to find new methods for insuring agency fidelity to
congressional intent. It inserted legislative vetoes into an array of statutes. It
held hundreds of oversight hearings. Members of Congress wrote more and
more detailed legislation, and in a variety of ways, encouraged the courts to
scrutinize the activities of the executive branch. They wrote liberal judicial
review provisions, eliminated jurisdictional barriers, made it easier for
plaintiffs to receive attorneys fees, and at times gave courts rather than
agencies the primary responsibility for carrying out new programs.71 Framing
programs in terms of rights enforced and often defined by the courts proved
a successful strategy for congressional entrepreneurs seeking to bypass the
president.
3. Politically weakened states. As the history of the EAHCA demon-
strates, in the 1970s and 1980s state and local governments were often forced
to bear the costs of programs that federal officials created and from which they
derived considerable political credit. A wide variety of groups discovered the
advantage of including more strings and mandates in federal statutes.
In 1956, for example, Congress established the interstate highway system
in an act only 28 pages long; the federal government placed very few
constraints on the use of federal funds. By 1991 the law's 293-page successor,
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, required state and federal
administrators not just to finish the remaining highways and improve public
transit, but to "relieve congestion, improve air quality, preserve historic sites,
encourage the use of auto seat belts and motorcycle helmets, control erosion
and storm runoff," reduce drunk driving, promote recycling, hire more
women, Native Americans, and members of other disadvantaged groups, and
even "control the use of calcium magnesium acetate in performing seismic
retrofits on bridges."72 Prior to the mid-1960s the federal government had
used its tax dollars to help states pursue projects they had selected. After the
71. MELNICK, BETWEEN TmE LINES, supra note 2, at 31-35.
72. James Q. Wilson, Can the Bureaucracy be Deregulated? Lessons from Government Agencies,
in DEREGULATING THE PUBLIC SERVICE: CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED? 43 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed.,
1994).
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mid-1960s it pursues a wide variety of objectives which often conflict with
state and local priorities.7 3
Although one might have expected this trend to weaken in the Reagan
years, huge federal deficits made the strategy of passing costs along to the
states even more appealing to members of Congress. According to the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Congress created no
mandates in either the 1940s or the 1950s, 12 in the 1960s, 22 in the 1970s,
and 27 in the 1980s.74 Despite the Reagan administration's proclaimed goal
of returning power to the states, "the pace of administrative rulemaking and of
new regulatory and preemptive enactments picked up as the decade progressed.
The end result was an accumulation of new requirements roughly comparable
to the record-setting pace of the 1970s."' In short, before the 1960s the states
received federal money with few strings; in recent years they have received
less money with far more strings.
There are many reasons for the declining political influence of sub-national
governments. Geographic mobility and the higher visibility of national policies
have reduced the public's attachment to state and local governments. Today
only about 60% of Americans live in the state of their birth.76 The civil rights
revolution not only discredited the old battle-cry of states rights, but also
reinforced what Alice Rivlin has described as "the escalating perception....
[that] states were performing badly even in areas that almost everyone regarded
as properly assigned to them."'
Moreover, members of Congress pay less attention to the interest of state
governments now that state parties no longer play a significant role in their
election. State administrators often form a powerful alliance with interest
groups, federal administrators, and congressional committees to protect and
expand federal regulation.78 As a result, Martha Derthick reports, each of the
mechanisms used by the federal government to influence states-court decrees,
legislative regulations, preemptions, and conditional grants-in-aid-has "grown
significantly more coercive in the past half century" "The rise of the
affirmative command, occurring subtly and on several different fronts,
constitutes a sea-change in federal-state relations.""
73. PETERSON, RABE & WONG, supra note 26, at ch. 1.
74. JOHN J. DIluLIo, JR. & DONALD F. KETL, BROOKINGS INSTIT., FINE PRINT: THE CONTRACT
wITH AMERICA, DEVOLurioN, AND THE ADMINISrRATIVE REALIES OF AMERICAN FEDERAUSM 40-44
(1995).
75. Timothy J. Conlan, And the Beat Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and Preemption in an
Era of Deregulation, 21 PUBLIUS 44, 44 (1991).
76. DilUio & XErL, supra note 68, at 6.
77. ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE STATES, AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 86-7 (1992).
78. PETERSON, RABE & WONG, supra note 26, at ch. 7.
79. Martha Derthick, Federal GovernmentMandates: Why the StatesAre Complaining, BROOKINGS
REV. 50, 51-52 (Fall 1992).
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4. New public expectations. The cumulative effect of the steady growth
of entitlement programs after 1932 was to change public expectations about the
role of government in general, and of the federal government in particular.
Social and economic hardships become public problems to be solved rather
than private woes to be endured. For most of their history Americans seeking
government assistance looked first to those governments closest at hand and to
the national government only if all else failed. Today, in contrast, even
Republicans allegedly committed to decentralization impatiently push for
aggressive federal action on such traditionally state and local matters as crime
control, tort reform, child support payments, and abortion.
Increased expectations about government assistance, of course, do not
prevent Americans from complaining about taxes or the quality of government
services. The opposite is the case: the more we expect, the more we complain.
As Republicans are now learning, the converse is true as well: complaining
about Washington does not prevent us from expecting more and better services.
For example, eighty percent of the American public agrees that "government
should be responsible for providing medical care for people who are unable to
pay for it. " I Apparently they just will not agree to accept the higher taxes or
expanded regulation necessary to do so.
V. END OF AN ERA?
Merely to list these four pillars of the old regime is to raise doubts about
its continued vitality. Each has either disappeared or come under sustained
assault. This being the case, how could a regime of programmatic rights long
endure?
1. Federal courts. In a variety of ways the Rehnquist Court has made
it more difficult for beneficiaries of government programs to prevail in cases
against state, local, and federal officials. Supreme Court decisions have
required judges to show more deference to the decisions of administrators,
81
raised standing requirements,' narrowed the definition of "nondiscretionary
duties, " ' and taken a hard line against implied private rights of action.'
Above all, the Rehnquist Court has emphasized its role as protector of
federalism. Last spring, for the first time in sixty years, the Court ruled that
a federal restriction on private action exceeded congressional power under the
80. Robert Samuelson, The Medicaid Morass, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY., Feb. 19, 1996, at 5
(citing research by Karlyn Bowman of AEI); see generally ROBERT SAMUELSON, THE GOOD LIFE AND
ITS DISCONTENTS (1995).
81. Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
82. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1996).
83. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
84. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
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Commerce Clause.A Less dramatic, but probably more important, is the
Court's reluctance to find legally binding commands in federal statutes.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "if Congress intends to impose a
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By
insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation." 86 Justice O'Connor has argued that this "clear statement rule
is not a mere canon of statutory interpretation. ... The rule protects the
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government struck by the
Constitution."' The change in legal culture is so great that it is now possible
to find respectable defenders of state and local governments at Yale Law
School-though probably not yet at Harvard.
2. The Republican Congress. In a variety of instances in the 1980s and
early 1990s, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of a rights-based statute,
and Congress reversed the Court. The most notable examples were the Grove
City bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. As the history of the EAHCA
shows, there were others as well.
No one would expect the Congress elected in 1994 to act similarly. One of
the few elements of the Contract for America to become law was legislation
restricting unfunded mandates. The agenda of the current congressional
leadership includes converting categorical grants into block grants, reducing
social regulation, ending affirmative action, and cutting federal spending.
Congress may not succeed in enacting legislation, but committee leaders are
certainly not going to engage in the sort of entrepreneurial activity that has
expanded programmatic rights.
Just as importantly, the Republican Congress has taken a variety of actions
that limit the ability of federal judges to promote programmatic rights. Most
obvious are the restrictions placed on the Legal Services Corporation by the
appropriations bills passed by Congress. These bills not only make drastic cuts
in the Legal Services budget, but also prohibit its attorneys from filing class
action suits, representing immigrants, or commenting on proposed regulations.
3. States Resurgent. In recent years, returning responsibilities to state
and local governments has become more politically popular and intellectually
respectable. Public opinion polls indicate that people think they get better
service from state and local governments than from the national government-a
85. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
86. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (citations omitted).
87. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n., 112 S. Ct. 560, 567 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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sharp reversal from previous trends.8" A variety of studies indicate that
decentralization improves the quality of public education and crime control.8 9
State governments have proven themselves to be thoughtful innovators in areas
ranging from health care to environmental protection.
In the 1960s the federal government benefitted from the disrepute of state
and local governments: Expanding the power of the central government was
seen as the only way to deal with racist, corrupt, malapportioned, and
unprofessional sub-national government. Today, in contrast, state and local
governments are viewed as an alternative to an allegedly bloated, untrustwor-
thy, and unaccountable federal government. In 1972 nearly half the public
considered local property tax the "worst tax"; only 19% gave that label to the
federal income tax. Today, in contrast, 36% consider the federal income tax
the worst tax-ten percent more than the property tax.'
The new-found clout of state governors has been particularly apparent in
the debate over welfare and Medicaid. Congress has followed the lead of the
National Governors Association, which in the past seldom took a clear position
on such controversial issues. New Republican governors have been particularly
forceful, and perhaps foolhardy, in demanding increased state authority even
when it means accepting fewer federal dollars. This push for greater state
control has not come from rural and southern states, but from such traditionally
progressive states as Wisconsin, California, Massachusetts, Illinois, New
Jersey, and Michigan.
4. The collapse of confidence in government. One cannot read a
newspaper without being told that the public no longer trusts the federal
government. Just because journalists believe this is true doesn't necessarily
mean that it is false. A wide variety of polls show that public confidence in
government-and in almost every other institution-has declined steadily since
the late 1960s.9 In the mid-1960s three-quarters of the American public
thought the federal government would do the right thing most of the time.
Today only two of ten offer this view. Eighty percent rate the value they get
from federal taxes as fair or poor.' A recent CNN-Time magazine poll found
that fifty-five percent of the public agrees that "the federal government has
88. WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE CHANGING AMERICAN MIND 82, 83, 447-50 (1993).
89. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, PoLmcS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
(1990); Mark Moore, Policing: Deregulating or Redefining Accountability?, in DEREGULATING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR: CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED (John J. Dilulio ed., 1994); David Osborne, A New
Federal Compact: Sorting Out Washington's Proper Role, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE 237 (Will Marshall
& Martin Schram eds., 1993).
90. Karlyn Bowman & Everett Carll Ladd, Opinion Pulse, AM. ENTERPRISE, March/April 1995,
at 102.
91. The best study is SEYMOUR M. LiSEr & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP (1987).
92. DIIULIo & KIETL, supra note 68, at 59 (citing data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research); Bowman & Ladd, supra note 90, at 103.
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become so large and powerful that it poses a threat to the rights and freedoms
of ordinary citizens." 93 About half the public believes that government
policies increase economic inequality; more than a third believe that govern-
ment programs have increased the number of single-parent families and the rate
of violent crime. Only one voter in ten believes that the federal government has
ameliorated these problems.94
In 1994 President Clinton's health care proposal foundered on the shoals
of public fear of government bureaucracy. The budget battles of the past two
years have hardly restored public faith. Two years after promoting the right to
health security the President told the American people "the era of big
government is over." 95
VI. ENDING ONE ENTITLEMENT AS WE ONCE KNEW IT
Nowhere are the consequences of these political shifts more apparent than
in welfare policy. Given the perennial political weakness of AFDC and the
explosive recent growth of Medicare, it is hardly surprising that these were
among the first targets of House Republicans. In December, 1995, Congress
sent the President a budget reconciliation bill that converted both AFDC and
Medicaid into block grants, freezing federal spending for the former and
limiting the latter to five percent annual increases. President Clinton twice
vetoed the Republicans' welfare reform proposals, but eventually signed a bill
restructuring AFDC. This legislation deserves our attention not only because
it will affect the lives of millions of poor families, but because it may be a
harbinger of a revitalized federalism to come.
The new law switches AFDC funding from a matching grant to a block
grant, and gives states sweeping control over eligibility rules and benefit levels.
Not leaving anything to chance-or the vagaries of judicial interpretation-
section 401(b) proclaims, "NO INDIVIDUAL ENTITLEMENT.-This part
shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under
any State program funded by this part." 91 The law prohibits families from
receiving public assistance for more than five years, then announces the rule
of interpretation that federal restrictions "shall not be interpreted to require any
State to provide assistance to any individual for any period of time under the
State program under this part."97 The legislation attempts to circumvent the
Supreme Court's ruling in Shapiro v. Thompson by explicitly permitting states
to pay less to new residents than to those who have lived in the state for more
93. William Schneider, When Politics As Usual Isn't Enough, NAT'L J., Nov. 18, 1995, at 2902.
94. Thomas B. Edsall, The GOP Gains Ground as Trust in Government Erodes, WASH. POsr
NAT'L WKLY., Feb. 12, 1996, at 12 (citing pol conducted by Harvard and Kaiser Foundation).
95. 1996 State of the Union Address, reprinted in 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 258 (1996).
96. Pub. L. No. 104-725, § 401(b) (1996).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-725, § 408(a)(2)(D) (1996) (emphasis added).
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than a year.
Although the new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant
establishes few federal rules on who must receive benefits, it establishes a
variety of rules stating who cannot receive federal funds. Adults receiving aid
must begin working within two years, either in the private sector or in public
service jobs. Eligibility ends completely after five years. Unwed teenage
mothers cannot receive benefits unless they live with their parents and stay in
school. Immigrants-legal as well as illegal-are ineligible.
Like the existing AFDC statute, the new law makes no provision for legal
suits by beneficiaries against the states or the federal government. An
amendment to provide for such judicial review was defeated in the Senate
Finance Committee by a vote of 4-16, never to appear again.98 Interestingly,
a Medicaid plan passed by both houses of Congress in both 1995 and 1996-
which included more guarantees of coverage than the AFDC plan-prohibited
beneficiaries and providers from bringing suits against the states.99
This legislation did not appear out of the blue. Rather, it represents the
culmination of a twenty-five year effort by conservative critics of federal
policies to impose more restrictions on recipients. As noted above, the Senate
has repeatedly passed legislation to overturn the courts' interpretations since
1970. Until 1981 this legislation was routinely blocked by the House. The
election of Ronald Reagan altered this political dynamic. The budget
reconciliation bills of 1981, 1982, and 1985 contained a variety of provisions
reversing court rulings and tightening eligibility. Yet no legislation-including
the Family Support Act of 1988, which made extensive changes in AFDC-
addressed forthrightly the long-simmering issue of the authority of the states
and the federal government.
Meanwhile, two developments outside Congress slowly pushed the
pendulum toward state control. First, the Rehnquist Court has backed away
from the King-Townsend-Remillard trilogy. Since 1984 it has decided six
AFDC cases, each time upholding state restrictions on eligibility and
benefits. 100 Although Legal Services and their clients have won occasional
cases in the lower courts, the new-found consistency of the Court has
substantially reduced the influence of the federal judiciary on AFDC.
The second development is the opening of the "waivers" loophole by the
White House and HHS. Included in a set of amendments Congress adopted in
1962 was a little noted provision to allow the Secretary of HEW to waive state
98. S. REP. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1995).
99. Colette Fraley, Key Medicaid Provisions, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3540 (1995); Jeffrey Katz,
Committee Gives Party Vote to Welfare, Medicaid Plan, 54 CON. Q. WKLY. REP. 1877 (1996). Neither
bill became law.
100. The most recent case is Anderson v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1291 (1995); see also MELNICK,
supra note 3, at 104-08.
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compliance with federal statutory requirements in the case of "any experimen-
tal, pilot, or demonstration projects which, in the Commissioner's judgment,
are likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the statute."0 1 Waivers
were seldom granted before the twilight of the Reagan Administration when
states proposed, and HHS approved, AFDC eligibility and benefit rules well
outside the confines of what federal judges and administrators had deemed
acceptable over the previous fifteen years.1
The trickle of waivers that began in 1986 became a flood during the Bush
and Clinton Administrations. Many of these waivers allowed states to impose
time limits on receipt of AFDC; others penalized families in which children
failed to attend school and mothers who gave birth to children while receiving
AFDC. Only one federal court has deemed a federal waiver invalid. 3
Generally the courts have given HHS wide berth in applying the waiver
provision. 104
The new welfare law contains elements of two quite different approaches
to restructuring assistance to the poor. It both increases the states' control over
eligibility and imposes nationally uniform rules designed to force recipients to
find jobs. The. Republicans' desire to return power to sub-national governments
is tempered by their desire to force states (especially traditionally liberal states
such as New York, Connecticut, and Minnesota) to get tough with recipients.
It is filled with strings and mandates which intrude on state autonomy far more
than the original Title IV of the Social Security Act. Ironically, it was liberals
and moderates in the Senate who argued for state control over the eligibility of
teenage mothers and women bearing children while receiving AFDC benefits.
Conservatives, especially those in the House, demonstrated the depth of their
commitment to state control by pushing hard for rigid federal mandates.
Both liberals and conservatives have described the new law as a major step
toward the wholesale restructuring of the American welfare state. Robert Dole
crowed, "[w]e are not only fixing welfare; we are revolutionizing it. We are
writing truly historic landmark legislation, legislation that ends-ends-a sixty-
year entitlement program." 5 Senator Carol Moseley-Braun warned that we
are going "back to the days of street urchins and friendless foundlings and
101. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 205 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1310(b)(1)(1994)).
102. Teles, supra note 62, at ch. 7.
103. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. See, e.g., C. K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995) (granting summary judgment and
upholding waiver). For a critique of the courts' laissez-faire attitude toward waivers, see Lucy A.
Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 8, 24 (1994) ("HHS has turned a carefully regulated federal entitlement program into
a group of highly discretionary state programs."). One might add that the courts' interpretation of
section 1115 is almost as implausible as the previous rulings of the Supreme Court, which had turned
a group of highly discretionary state programs into a extensively regulated federal entitlement program.
105. Remarks From the Floor, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2909 (1995).
Constructing a New Federalism
homeless half-orphans."" °1 Representative Charles Rangel described the law
as a "cruel monstrosity," "the most radical and mean-spirited attack against the
poor that I have witnessed during my service in Government.""09 Senator
Moynihan went even further, calling the law "the most brutal act of social
policy since Reconstruction." He warned,
It is the first step in dismantling the social contract that has been in
place in the United States since at least the 1930s. Do not doubt that
Social Security itself ... will be next. 108
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer shared Moynihan's
diagnosis but did not mourn the loss: he described passionate objections to
welfare reform legislation as "the dying throes of the federal welfare
state." 109
The previous discussion of the history of AFDC should make us wary of
such hyperbole: the sixty-one-year-old entitlement was always something of a
phantom. Individual entitlements were created by the federal courts, which
have backed away from many of their earlier decisions. Advocates of national
uniformity for AFDC have never put together a majority in Congress and have
been steadily losing support for years. In many respects, the new law
resembles both the original version of Title IV and the bill passed by the
Senate in 1970 to overturn the Supreme Court's interpretation. One major
difference between the original Title IV and the new program is that the latter
establishes more federal restrictions, especially in regard to time limits and
work requirements.
In a calmer moment Senator Moynihan, perhaps the only current member
of Congress to understand the history of AFDC, offered this candid and
accurate account of the entitlement created by Title IV:
The Federal law enacted in 1935 provided the several States with a
Federal guarantee that whatever amount they provide by way of support
for dependent children will be matched, according to formula, by the
Federal government. This is what we mean when we speak of welfare
as an entitlement. It is an entitlement of the several States to support
from the Federal government. 110
106. Id.
107. Quoted in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A23.
108. Quoted in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, atA16, A19. Moynihan even predicted that "the effect
of this on New York could be something approaching the Apocalypse." Id. at A16.
109. Jeffrey L. Katz, House Passes Welfare Bill; Senate Likely to Alter It, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 872 (1995).
110. S. REP. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1995).
Symposium Issue:325, 1996
Federalism and the New Rights
Although the block grants created in 1996 continue the guarantee of federal
support to the states, it creates a much different incentive structure. Instead of
paying half or more of the cost of each new recipient, the new arrangement
provides each state with a fixed amount of money, with no adjustments for
increases or decreases in caseloads. This means that states must cover 100%
of the marginal costs of the program-and retain 100% of the possible savings.
The fiscal incentives for states to reduce spending become even stronger when
one considers the combined effect of AFDC and food stamps."'
Given the states' current control over the AFDC standards of need, the
Rehnquist Court's deference to state rules, and the proliferation of federal
waivers, we have a pretty good idea what states will do in the short run under
the new law. More work requirements, more time limits, wedfare, learnfare,
residency requirements of dubious constitutionality-all these will prolifer-
ate."' As long as the economy and state revenues continue to grow, draconi-
an cuts are unlikely.
Making long-run predictions is considerably more difficult. Economic
downturns simultaneously decrease state revenues and increase the number of
people eligible for public assistance. In the early 1980s, many states increased
spending on means-tested programs to compensate for the decline in federal
spending. But the fiscal incentives created by the block grant scheme would
make this more difficult. Not only do we have little idea how states will react
to these new incentives, but we do not know to what extent their programs will
move recipients from welfare to work, discourage out-of-wedlock births, and
collect child support payments from absent fathers. If states fail to make
significant inroads on work, child support, and out-of-wedlock births, the
pressure to cut benefits will be very strong.
Current public and congressional support for devolution is more pragmatic
than heartfelt. It is not sustained by an abiding attachment to local communities
or by that old prop of states' rights, naked racism. Block grants present
members of Congress with an easy way to cut spending without directly
reducing benefits. According to Martha Derthick, Republican governors were
able to sell their plan to Congress in 1995
111. Under the current system, when one combines AFDC and food stamp expenditures, a low-
income state receives a marginal inflow of $1.80 in federal dollars when it raises state spending by
$1.00, and a net outflow of $1.80 when it reduces spending by one dollar. A high-income state currently
increases federal spending by $0.40 when it increases spending by one dollar, and loses $0.40 for each
dollar it cuts from state spending. Under the new law, in contrast, increasing spending by a dollar in
both low-income and high-income states would reduce federal contribution by $0.30. Cutting state
spending by a dollar would increase federal spending in the state by $0.30. Robert D. Reichauer & R.
Kent Weaver, Financing Welfare: Are Block Grants the Answer?, in LOOKING BEFORE WE LEAP:
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND WELFARE REFORM (R. Kent Weaver & William T. Dickens eds., 1995).
112. Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law, The New Welfare Cutbacks and Litigational
Responses, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 760 (1992).
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because they claimed to know what to do about one of the great
unsolved dilemmas of public policy-the persistence of a dependent
population in an era when everyone, even a woman with children, is
expected to work. [They] were ready to tell newly empowered
congressional Republicans just what they wanted to hear about
welfare-that work programs and family caps and time limits were a
fiX. 113
Senator John Breaux has warned that the block grant legislation "simply puts
the welfare problems in a box and ships it to the states. When the states open
the box, they're going to find a whole lot of problems and less money to help
solve them."" 4
Unfortunately, decades of research suggest that "overcoming the employ-
ment and other problems of long-term welfare recipients is a costly and slow
process that yields only modest increases in earnings and the very opposite of
immediate budgetary savings."" 5 What will happen when, as seems likely,
state governments do not achieve their goals of reducing costs and moving
people from welfare to work? Let me suggest a likely chain of events:
substantial cuts for people who are clearly needy; multiple court suits; media
attention and growing popular concern about the adequacy of the "safety net";
state demands for more federal funding; more federal strings added to what
were billed as block grants; and renewed judicial efforts to enforce these
federal mandates. Liberals will demand federal protections for recipients and
conservatives will demand stronger federal measures to combat dependency.
Sound familiar?
VII. MIXED MESSAGES
The larger, even more difficult question lurking behind this discussion of
welfare reform is whether the 1996 law represents an isolated attack on a soft
target, or (to continue the military metaphor) a full-scale assault that strikes
first at the soft underbelly of the welfare state. What, if anything, does this
struggle tell us about the future of other entitlements programs? In thinking
about this question, it is important to keep four factors in mind.
First, President Clinton's opposition to Republicans' efforts to turn
Medicaid and food stamps over to the states preserved these programs as
federal entitlements. Not only did Democrats demonstrate that it is possible to
defend some means-tested programs without committing political suicide, but
113. Martha Derthick, The Governors and Welfare Reform, BROOINGS REV., Spring 1996, at 44-
45.
114. S. REP. No. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1995).
115. Hugh Heclo, Poverty Poltics, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 396,
417 (Sheldon H. Danzinger, Gary D. Sandefur & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1994).
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Republicans discovered (once again) the political dangers of attacking health
care and nutrition programs. Indeed, despite the alleged Reagan Revolution,
means-tested programs have not fared badly over the past decade and a half.
Consider the following:
* Even after the cuts imposed in 1995 and 1996, food stamp spending will
stay over $20 billion per year. Ten years ago food stamp appropriations
were $10 billion per year.
* The 1995 budget reconciliation bill made modest cuts in the Earned
Income Tax Credit. The cost of the EITC grew from zero in 1975 to $13
billion in 1992 to $26 billion in 1996.116 In his 1995 veto message
President Clinton singled out the EITC reductions as particularly objection-
able. 117
* The 1995 reconciliation bill set federal Medicaid spending at approxi-
mately $97 billion for 1996, rising to $127 billion in 2002.118 Compare
that with spending over the past decade and a half. Total (state plus federal)
spending on Medicaid was approximately $30 billion in 1980, $54 billion
in 1988, and is estimated to have reached $152.4 billion in 1994. Medicaid
spending has increased 17.8% per year since 1988, well above the rate of
health care inflation." 9
In 1981 and 1982 the Reagan Administration pushed through significant
budget cuts for AFDC, food stamps, and other means-tested program. But,
according to Robert Greenstein of the Center for Budget Priorities, "even by
1982 the political tide had begun to turn. The administration achieved less than
one-fifth of the additional reductions in means-tested entitlement reductions it
requested that year, and after 1982, the federal reductions virtually ceased.
Indeed, several of these programs once again began to expand, in some cases
significantly."" 2 After the initial cuts, public sentiment shifted toward doing
more to help the needy, and Democrats in Congress took advantage of this
opportunity to criticize the Reagan Administration and to expand benefits. In
short, the alleged war on the poor-which itself is an attack on a very small
portion of the welfare state-has so far produced meager results.
Second, Republicans in Congress have been understandably timid when
116. AlissaJ. Rubin, Low-Income Workers'Tax CreditAmong GOPBudget Targets, 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REp. 3055, 3057 (1995). The author notes that the plan would reduce benefits by 18 % over the
next seven years. Id. at 3362.
117. Presidential Veto Message of the 1996 Budget Reconciliation Bill (H.R. 2491), 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3762 (1995).
118. Colette Fraley, supra note 94, at 3540.
119. Colette Fraley, The Blossoming of Medicaid, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1638 (1995).
120. Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative
View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 440 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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talking about cuts in middle-class entitlements. Social security, by far the
largest entitlement and a fiscal problem which will dwarf all others in the next
century, was "off the table" during the 104th Congress. 2 1 Modest cuts in
Medicare-most of which directly affected providers not beneficiaries-
seriously damaged the Republicans in the polls. Republicans' unsuccessful
efforts to scale back environmental regulation produced bitter divisions within
the Party and serious damage to the Republican's popularity. Republican
pollster Frank Lutz warned that "Even the GOP faithful-who trust us
implicitly on everything else-have conceded the issue to the Democrats.""
This led Speaker Gingrich to urge his troops to pursue a kinder, gentler
environmental policy."
Third, many recent Supreme Court decisions on such matters as federalism,
private rights of action, review of agency action, and interpretation of civil
rights protections have been five to four votes. If President Clinton is
reelected, his selections could shift the Courts direction. President Clinton has
already appointed a significant number of district and circuit court judges, but
it is too early to know how different their decisions will be from those of
Reagan and Bush appointees.
It requires considerably less speculation to predict that state courts will play
an increasingly important role in many areas, especially welfare. Some state
courts will probably follow that of New York in finding a right to welfare in
the state constitution. 24 Many others will be called upon to interpret broadly
worded state statutes. As the states gain more control over welfare policy,
lawyers for aid recipients will focus attention on the requirements and
ambiguities of state laws."z Even if the federal entitlement disappears, the
state entitlement will remain.
Among the issues that state courts will inevitably face is the extent to which
states can shift costs to county governments and municipalities. Most states
have the authority to impose unfunded mandates on local governments.
Moreover, by slashing some programs (such as institutionalized care of the
retarded and disabled) they can force other levels of government (such as local
schools) to pick up the slack. As one county official has put it, "The political
equation for any governor, particularly a conservative governor, is going to be
to cut taxes. . . . If more people. are eligible, the only way to cover it is to
121. Julie Kosterlitz, Touching the Rail, 27 NAT'L J. 3136 (1995).
122. Quoted in Allan Freedman, Regulatory Overhaul Stymied By Internal Doubt, Division, 54
CONG. Q. WKLY RpT. 613 (1996).
123. See Allan Freedman, Republicans Concede Missteps in Effort to Rewrite Rules, 53 CONG. Q.
WKLY. RMyr. 3645 (1995); Allan Freedman, GOP Trying to Find Balance After Early Stumbles, 54
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 151 (1996).
124. Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990); Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y.
1977).
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have someone else raise taxes. That's why this whole decentralizing strategy
forces taxing authority to the local level."' 6 According to SUNY Professor
Beryl Radin, "Every time the governors have gotten carried away with arguing
for all this generic power, they get stuck holding the bag. But a lot of these
[current] governors aren't going to hold the bag." 27 Cost shifting is a game
everyone can play.
One of the underlying assumptions of this paper is that the American public
both demands extensive government benefits, services, and protections, and
feels angry about taxes, bureaucracy, and regulation. They expect a lot from
government, yet do not think that their government is doing a very good job.
Indeed, they fear that government programs multiply rather than solve social
problems. For example, every year over the past decade, more than sixty
percent of Americans have told pollsters that we are spending too little on
assistance for the poor." 8 Only ten percent say we are spending too much.
But sixty-nine percent believe that "the welfare system does more harm than
good, because it encourages the breakup of the family and discourages
work."" 9 Large majorities favor balancing the budget, but few voters support
cuts in social security or medical benefits nor do many favor tax increases. 30
These conflicting public views are a prime cause of divided government.
As William Schneider has pointed out, Democrats are good at enunciating what
the public thinks government should do. Republicans are equally good at
voicing the public's doubts about what government can do well.' 3 ' For many
years voters elected Republican presidents to guard against tax increases and
onerous regulation, and Democratic members of Congress to protect their
entitlements. Over the past two years this institutional pattern has been turned
upside down. Although Democrats are experts at snatching defeat from the
jaws of victory, it seems quite possible that we will have another four years of
a Democratic president and a Republican Congress. Some political scientists
call this "cognitive Madisonianism," meaning that the public distrusts both
parties and therefore elects a government in which each party checks the
other.32 One could be more blunt and call it a collective running away from
the apparent results of each previous election.
It is easy to imagine a second Clinton Administration vetoing major
legislation passed by a Republican Congress and using rulemaking, administra-
126. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Just Do It, 28 NAT'L J. 692, 701-02 (1996) (quoting Danes County
(Wisconsin) Executive Richard Philips).
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tive discretion, and careful management of litigation to protect and slowly
expand a variety of programmatic rights. One can also imagine a Republican
Congress taking aggressive steps to block these initiatives. Many of these
disputes would end up in court. Meanwhile the Clinton Administration will fill
a number of vacancies on the Supreme Court and on the lower courts. A
slightly modified regime of programmatic rights may thus survive.
Over the years politicians have been drawn to a number of gimmicks that
seem to reconcile the inconsistent demands of the public: block grants,
"reinventing government," the flat tax, "managed competition," and supply-
side economics. Programmatic rights are more than a gimmick. But they, too,
are a reflection of the public's desire to square the circle of more public aid
with less government interference. Programmatic rights are at one and the same
time claims upon the government and limits on the discretion of bureaucrats.
They enlarge the government while seeming to empower the individual. They
trumpet benefits while disguising costs. In a polity as volatile and cross-
pressured as ours, they are too serviceable to fade into the sunset.
